John Arntz, Director

Honorable Members
Board of Supervisors
City and County of San Francisco
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, Room 244
San Francisco, California 94102

# Statement of the Results City and County of San Francisco Special Recall Election – September 16, 2025

I, John Arntz, Director of Elections, certify that I have canvassed the ballots cast in the Special Recall Election held on Tuesday, September 16, 2025, in the City and County of San Francisco (City), in the manner required by Division 15 of the California Elections Code.

I certify that I began the canvass immediately upon the close of the polls and, as a result of the tabulation of all votes recorded, present a complete record entitled "Statement of the Results of the San Francisco Special Recall Election – September 16, 2025." I also certify that 21,542 voters cast ballots; therefore, 42.85% of San Francisco's 50,273 voters registered in Supervisorial District 4 participated in this election.

In accordance with California Elections Code section 15374, I certify that this Statement of the Results provides the total number of votes cast for and against the local ballot recall measure. The precinct detail of all votes cast appears in the Statement of the Vote, which is posted on the Department of Elections' website at *sfelections.gov/results* and is incorporated by reference into this Statement of the Results.

This Statement of the Results includes a table in Attachment 1 that lists the total votes cast for and against the local ballot recall measure, and is organized as follows:

## City Ballot Recall Measure

1. A, "Recall Measure Regarding Joel Engardio"

For the September 2025, Special Recall Election, voters in Supervisorial District 4 received a one-card ballot.

All ballots included the following measure:

Card 1: City Ballot Recall Measure A.

## SHA-512 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm

The Department of Elections applied a SHA-512 cryptographic function to reports associated with this election to establish the integrity of the results in a verifiable manner. Attachment 2 provides information regarding the SHA-512 hash values for all electronic files associated with the final, certified results reports.

## **Voting System and Election Transparency**

The City's voting system allows for increased election transparency through the posting of images of voted ballots, equipment logs, and other election reports, all of which have been posted with the final election results on the Department's website, *sfelections.gov*.

## Voted ballot images

The City's voting system captures images of each voted ballot cast in an election. This creates a visual history of how ballots were marked. After each election, the Department posts the ballot images on its website, allowing members of the public to view each voted ballot cast in the City. Prior to posting the ballot images, the Department reviews the images and redacts identifying information that voters may have placed on ballot cards.

### AuditMark

In addition to the voting system capturing images of voted ballot cards, the system also adds an explanation at the bottom of each ballot image indicating how the voting equipment interpreted and tallied each vote mark. These explanations, or AuditMarks, provide the public with information on how the voting system operates in relation to the recording and reporting of every vote cast in this election. This means that for every oval with a mark inside the voting target, even for partial marks, the voting system adds an explanation to the images of voted ballots of how the system understood and registered the markings within each oval.

### Cast Vote Record

The Department posted a "Cast Vote Record" that lists each vote recorded on each ballot card. The data provided in the Cast Vote Record is captured as the ballots are scanned by the voting equipment and before vote tabulation occurs, allowing members of the public to tabulate votes from specific precincts, districts, etc., and to compare with the official election results.

## **Attachments**

Attachment 1 provides a table that lists the votes cast for or against the local ballot recall measure.

Attachment 2 is the list of SHA-512 hashes associated with each final election results report.

Attachment 3 is the report from the manual tallies that the Department conducted on randomly selected polling place, voteby-mail, and provisional ballots to confirm the voting equipment operated properly, and accurately counted and reported election results.

In witness whereof, I hereby affix my hand and seal this 25th day of September in 2025.

John Arntz, Director of Elections



## CITY BALLOT MEASURE

I certify the results for the following CITY BALLOT RECALL MEASURE:

## 1. MEASURE A - Recall Measure Regarding Joel Engardio

This measure required 50% + 1 affirmative votes to pass.

7,110		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	Ballots Counted	Percentage	
YES	13,474	62.72%	
NO	8,009	37.28%	
Total	21,483		
Under Votes	58		
Over Votes	1		

## List of SHA-512 Hash Values for Certified Results Reports Special Recall Election, September 16, 2025

This list represents the various certified results reports the Department of Elections issued for the September 16, 2025, Special Recall Election. The file names for each report are listed numerically, and underneath each file name is the SHA-512 cryptographic hash value applicable to each file. All reports are posted on the Department's website: <a href="https://www.sfelections.gov/results">www.sfelections.gov/results</a>

1. "Summary – PDF," lists a summary of votes cast by contest, using a PDF format.

## Hash value:

294336348C72D3C2F9C071E62B3F3D1E7796E31EC328BBF5015D960E7022E6FF7B89E02D24AE 5EEA05108222B8E11F34AFDBFF3461BB7734843DE7426DC40F94

2. "Summary – Excel," lists a summary of votes cast by contest, using Microsoft Excel.

## Hash value:

3FEFE1604F2DA0EF63D445DCE34E1F84151A858BA5E528A611AE2F02DC4E7834AFE83EF7028C770DDCD016DBEE465A57596560663DF0C90E03D2048F6C008C44

3. "Summary – XML," lists a summary of votes cast by contest, using XML format.

## Hash value:

DE4D1725C175CCF2300C1FCF88D54E7CC35187BBA71647BAA316B7531015C321CC3C0511906 DF82B87B6AA72BB7483FB1429B68C235BFC6E0A9413E7A5DB2CF9

4. "SOV – PDF," lists votes cast in each precinct and for each contest, using a PDF format.

### Hash value:

D36A78F2753FEB53A10B182936FB5F226C35D43B060D1E5BC9C9EF9A57E235BC9EFBBF596127 7CB6855B86841D160883666F314EDFBD01AE2B78885DC1F5DD97

5. "SOV – Excel," lists votes cast in each precinct and for each contest, using Microsoft Excel.

## Hash value:

1E80A696AD6C894737F9412A635CF78BB87BBCE4098B77CA28A67CA4FC83A6EF1773C16A1570 F9B9DCF2F196F7830A720F177DCFF9ACA12E3C9C074D7289F828

6. "District SOV – PDF," lists votes cast in each district and for each contest, using a PDF format.

## Hash value:

E215FDE2FBEB1AC0AA07157A8A2161FFC096670BCD7310F8A44E7A5A16C1D36911DBD9318E1C 472CCAE451B5EADD3902282A02B27E16A5C3B9B894495BA8FC2A

7. "District SOV – Excel," lists votes cast in each district and for each contest, using Microsoft Excel.

## List of SHA-512 Hash Values for Certified Results Reports Special Recall Election, September 16, 2025

### Hash value:

37645F22AD54572FBCA872239A577D6F61D8B7E732F360E7D32CA07928FADBDFFB92B5A3FBAC D39026CFDE2B73020E376C7684362D6F5832DA156152F52C3773

8. "Cast Vote Record - JSON," lists votes cast on each ballot card in a zipped JSON format.

### Hash value:

CB2A02E871520BF94AEB8F9F226800F1EAF31E87D5D227B3C95D720E352AB7143D9CBDD144FF AB1484FA04C9991199A31054FCD46673EB5F2B0FD27A116826B0

9. "Ballot Images, Supervisorial District 4 - ZIP", contains scanned ballot images in zipped TIFF format.

## Hash value:

967622C018A0EEF4C097B9B80B5DC2580388AD641B43082CEFB5CE84C2A43F6EC2E41B5D86E7 6684D55F38E2473EFD0FBB6269C602A82B5BD0038E2F7CA5D292

 "Ballot Scanning Machine Logs - ZIP," audit logs from Ballot Scanning Machines used at Polling Places on Election Day.

## Hash value:

489C04201FA77E72F66718742063D82AE2E594DF0DF9F68F6093D8EE0E6C7ADE283AF4FB337B1 04A042D54ACBE414FB50197AE10350E090B71B8B8CF0E45BAFF

11. "Vote-by-Mail Status Report," lists the disposition of the vote-by-mail ballots the Department received.

## Hash value:

6C5BD0BFD989B88600DD752169A6C94E05C5DE4B82C14CA374F4D473084694C83FCD34AA71E 510FE9F717DE1262D4A9197F0AB7168C29EE9AF93D84AB600C3A9

12. "Provisional Ballot Status Report," lists the disposition of the provisional ballots the Department received.

## Hash value:

A1572A27188B490C730531A7D814B6F2BC84488E2E03CA0B5832BD0880010A9C8590A7CF80E1 DC7C97BD3A62423B8BDDF3C054BEC0A09AE8824A4F812E750DAD

13. "Conditional Voter Registration Report," lists the disposition of the ballots cast during the Conditional Voter Registration period.

## Hash value:

51A81C1EAB90F80BD6EBC6D676F3CDC9F9C1E270E3431C5F1042D7C9E50BD05BA2D5A1A2938 F42E426015A83D7142484C6FB28CB5F18F1E57DBDE41BAB745FD7

## List of SHA-512 Hash Values for Certified Results Reports Special Recall Election, September 16, 2025

14. "SHA-512.csv," provides a list of all hashed election results files in CSV format.

## Hash value:

95E27D2625B93836E9AEAC131D695F93D7A3490F2045EA5C5D7677C8E517612835390F8663B8 E202F2DFFFAEB2B04EAA0BBAB558CABDBBBA9D283093A88A717F

John Arntz, Director

September 25, 2025

California Secretary of State 1500 11th Street, 5th Floor Sacramento, CA 95814

## Special Recall Election September 16, 2025, Results of 1% Post-Election Manual Tallies

Pursuant to state elections law, the San Francisco Department of Elections (Department) is required to conduct a manual tally of all ballots cast in 1% of San Francisco's polling places and 1% of the vote-by-mail ballots cast, and may also manually tally 1% of provisional ballots cast, as part of the Official Canvass of the election. The Department compares the results of the manual tallies to the results reports generated by the voting equipment used to tabulate ballot cards. The purpose of the manual tallies is to verify the accuracy of the voting equipment used in the election. Upon completion of the 1% manual tallies, the Department prepares a report on the results of the manual tallies and includes the report in the certification of the Official Canvass for the election.

The following is a report on the results of the manual tallies of ballots cast at 1% of the polling places and 1% of the vote-bymail ballots cast, as well as all of the provisional ballots voted in San Francisco's Special Recall Election held on September 16, 2025,

## Random Selection of Precincts

On September 24, 2025, the Department conducted a random selection of the precinct and batch for the manual tallies in accordance with California Elections Code section 15360.

Five days prior to selecting the precinct and the batch for the manual tallies, the Department issued a press release and posted a public notice on its website, sfelections.gov, and outside its office, announcing the date, time, and place of the random selection of precincts and batches. Additionally, the Department webcast the random selection process and posted the recording on its website.

For this Special Recall Election, the Department was required to conduct a manual tally of ballots cast in a minimum of one precinct, to represent 1% of San Francisco's 20 polling places included in the election, one batch of vote-by-mail ballots to represent 1% of 47 batches processed. The Department also selected all of the provisional ballots cast for manual tallying.

The random selection was divided into two categories. The first category was for selecting the one precinct. The second category was for selecting one batch (or box) of vote-by-mail ballots. For the provisional ballots, since only one batch was accumulated, the whole batch was manually tallied without needing a random selection process. Using two 10-sided dice, the Department randomly selected the precinct and using the same two 10-sided dice, randomly selected the vote-by-mail batch to be tallied in full. The list of the randomly selected precinct and batch is listed in Part I at the end of this report.

## Conducting the 1% Manual Tallies

The 1% manual tallies of the randomly selected precinct and batch were conducted on Wednesday, September 24, 2025, and was completed on the same day. The manual tallies were conducted in the Department's main office in San Francisco's City Hall, which is located at 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place. The manual tallies were open to public observation both in person and via live streaming on the Department's website at *sfelections.gov/live*.

For each selected precinct and batch, Department personnel manually tallied votes cast on the ballots, including polling place ballots cast using the Ballot Scanning Machines (BSM), and accepted vote-by-mail and provisional ballots, including those issued at the Department's City Hall Voting Center. Vote-by-mail and provisional ballots, and paper duplications of ballots through the remake process using the Ballot Marking Device are tabulated using the Image Cast Central (ICC) machines. The manual counts were then compared against the results reports generated from the voting system. If there were any discrepancies between the two tallies, Department personnel sought resolution or explanations for these discrepancies and documented the resolutions using Manual Tally Incident forms.

Department personnel were assembled into one team of four people to manually tally votes on the polling place ballots, vote-by-mail, and provisional ballots. The team was assigned one precinct or one batch to count at a time. After all the votes for the contest had been counted, a supervisor verified whether the manual counts matched the machine counts. Normally for a regular election with multiple contests on the ballot, once the team finished the count for a contest, they would proceed to the next contest. Since there is only one contest on the ballot for this election, once the team completed the precinct ballots, they proceeded to tally the VBM ballots, and then finally the PV ballots.

### Results of the 1% Manual Tallies

In accordance with the Post-Election Manual Tally Emergency Regulations, a "variance" means any difference between the manual tally and the machine tally for a contest, including, but not limited to, differences due to machine malfunction, operator error, or voter error in marking a ballot. Upon completion of the manual tallies associated with ballots cast in the September 16, 2025, Special Recall Election, the Department found no discrepancies between the manual tallies and the results issued by the voting system.

The results of the 1% manual tallies confirmed that the voting equipment used in the September 16, 2025, Special Recall Election accurately tabulated and reported votes cast for and against the one recall measure appearing on the official ballot for voters registered in Supervisorial District 4.

The following tables summarize the manual tallies.

Part I. Randomly Selected Precinct and Batches Tallied for the 1% Manual Tally

Part II. Summary of Results of the 1% Manual Tally

Part I: Randomly Selected Precinct and Batch for the 1% Manual Tallies

## Randomly Selected Precincts/Batches Tallied for the 1% Manual Tally September 16, 2025, Special Recall Election

First precinct selected for Precinct Ballots			First batch selected for Vote-By-Mail Ballots				
Order Drawn	Precinct	Ballot Type	Contests Tallied	Order Drawn	Batch	Ballot Type	Contests Tallied
1st	9427	1	All	1st	41	1	All

Part II: Summary of Results of the 1% Manual Tallies

Summary of Results of the 1% Manual Tally September 16, 2025, Special Recall Election					
Precinct	Contests Tallied	Precinct Ballots			
		Discrepancies found?	Causes		
9427	All	No	NA		
Vote-By- Mail Ballot Batch Contests Tallied		Vote-by-Mail Ballots			
(Box)#		Discrepancies found?	Causes		
41	All	No	NA		
Provisional Ballot Batch	Contests Tallied	Provisional Ballots			
(Box)#		Discrepancies found?	Causes		
6001	All	No	NA		