Honorable Members
Board of Supervisors
City and County of San Francisco
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, Room 244
San Francisco, California 94102

Statement of the Results
City and County of San Francisco
Consolidated Special Municipal Election – February 15, 2022

I, John Arntz, Director of Elections, certify that I have canvassed the ballots cast in the Consolidated Special Municipal Election held on Tuesday, February 15, 2022, within the City and County of San Francisco, in the manner required by Division 15 of the California Elections Code.

I certify that I began the canvass immediately upon the close of the polls on February 15, 2022, and, as a result of the tabulation of all votes recorded, present a complete record entitled "Statement of the Results of the Consolidated Special Municipal Election – February 15, 2022." I also declare that the number of ballots cast in said election was 179,981, which signifies that 36.01% of San Francisco's 499,771 registered voters voted in this election.

In accordance with California Elections Code section 15400, I certify that the total number of votes cast for each candidate and ballot measure in this Statement of the Results and the precinct detail of all votes cast: appears in the Statement of the Vote, which is posted on the Department of Elections’ website at sfelections.org/feb2022results, and is incorporated by reference to this Statement of the Results.

This Statement of the Results includes tables that present summarized totals of votes cast. The tables are organized in the following manner:

1. State Assembly District 17
2. Local Ballot Measures: three recall questions for Board of Education Members, San Francisco Unified School District
3. Assessor-Recorder

For this election, all voters received a one-card ballot. Voters living in State Assembly District 17 received ballots with all of the contests and measures listed above, while voters registered outside of the District received ballots that included the three local measures and the Assessor-Recorder contest.

Although this Statement of the Results includes the contest for United States Representative, District 13, the boundary that places this district within San Francisco extends across San Francisco Bay and crosses the extreme southwest corner of Alameda Island. Other than this uninhabited corner, the district lies entirely within Alameda County. This is why the table showing results for this contest indicates 0 votes and 0% turnout.

English (415) 554-4375 sflections.org
Fax (415) 554-7344 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
TTY (415) 554-4386 City Hall, Room 48, San Francisco, CA 94102

中文 (415) 554-4367
Español (415) 554-4366
Filipino (415) 554-4310
SHA-512 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm
The Department of Elections applied a SHA-512 cryptographic function to reports associated with this election to establish the integrity of the results in a verifiable manner. Attachment 2 provides information regarding the SHA-512 hash values for all electronic files associated with the final, certified results reports.

Voting System and Election Transparency
The City’s voting system allows for increased election transparency through the posting of images of voted ballots, equipment transaction logs, and other election reports, all of which will be posted with the final election results on the Department’s website, sflections.org.

Voted ballot images. The City’s voting system captures images of each voted ballot cast in an election. This creates a visual history of how ballots were marked. After each election, the Department posts the ballot images on its website, allowing members of the public to view each voted ballot cast in the City. Prior to posting the ballot images, the Department reviews the images and redacts identifying information that voters may have placed on ballot cards.

AuditMark. In addition to the voting system capturing images of voted ballot cards, the system also adds an explanation at the bottom of each ballot image indicating how the voting equipment interpreted and tallied each vote mark. These explanations, or AuditMarks, provide the public with information on how the voting system operates in relation to the recording and reporting of every vote cast in this election. This means that for every oval with a mark inside the voting target, even for partial marks, the voting system adds an explanation to the images of voted ballots of how the system understood and registered the markings within each oval.

Ballot Audit and Review. The Department will post an application that allows the public to sort the ballot images according to precinct, contest, and district. The City is the first jurisdiction in the country to utilize this application, known as "Ballot Audit and Review."

Cast Vote Record. The Department posted a "Cast Vote Record" that lists each vote recorded on each ballot card associated with all contests and propositions. The data provided in the Cast Vote Record is captured from the ballots as the ballots are scanned by the voting equipment and before vote tabulation occurs, allowing members of the public to tabulate votes from specific precincts, districts, etc. and compare against the official election results.

Attachments
Attachment 1 provides tables that list the votes cast.

Attachment 2 is the list of SHA-512 hashes associated with each final election results report and machine audit logs.

Attachment 3 is the report from the manual tallies that the Department conducted on randomly selected polling place, vote-by-mail, and provisional ballots to confirm that the voting equipment operated properly, and accurately counted and reported election results.

In witness whereof, I hereby affix my hand and seal this 23rd day of February, 2022.

John Arntz, Director of Elections
Statement of the Results

NOTE: The counts for all overvotes (which occur when voters mark more than the allowed number of candidates, or, mark both "yes" and "no" for ballot measures) and undervotes (which occur when voters mark fewer than the allowed number of candidates, or, leave blank the voting targets for both "yes" and "no") are included, although neither overvotes nor undervotes represent valid votes cast and are not added to the tallies determining total votes for a candidate or whether a measure passes.

1. VOTER-NOMINATED OFFICE
   (Results represent votes cast in San Francisco only)

I hereby certify the results for the following VOTER-NOMINATED OFFICE:

MEMBER OF THE STATE ASSEMBLY, DISTRICT 17*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Vote Totals</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAVID CAMPOS</td>
<td>33,448</td>
<td>35.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATT HANEY</td>
<td>34,174</td>
<td>36.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BILAL MAHMOOD</td>
<td>20,895</td>
<td>22.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEA SELBY</td>
<td>5,261</td>
<td>5.61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Votes 93,778

Undervotes 6,346

Overvotes 416

Total Ballots Cast 100,540

* Since no candidate obtained a majority of votes cast in this voter-nominated contest, a special general election will occur on April 19, 2022. The ballot for this special election will list the names of the two candidates who received the most votes in the February 15, 2022, election.
## 2. CITY AND COUNTY PROPOSITIONS

*(All measures required 50%+1 affirmative votes to pass)*

I hereby certify the results for the following **CITY AND COUNTY PROPOSITIONS**:

### PROPOSITION A - "Shall Alison Collins be recalled (removed) from the School Board for the San Francisco Unified School District?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vote Totals</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Undervotes</th>
<th>Overvotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>134,871</td>
<td>76.28%</td>
<td>3,038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>41,928</td>
<td>23.72%</td>
<td></td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PROPOSITION B - "Shall Gabriela López be recalled (removed) from the School Board for the San Francisco Unified School District?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vote Totals</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Undervotes</th>
<th>Overvotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>127,022</td>
<td>72.06%</td>
<td>3,565</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>49,257</td>
<td>27.94%</td>
<td></td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PROPOSITION C - "Shall Faauuga Moliga be recalled (removed) from the School Board for the San Francisco Unified School District?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vote Totals</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Undervotes</th>
<th>Overvotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>121,197</td>
<td>68.87%</td>
<td>3,971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>54,785</td>
<td>31.13%</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. LOCAL OFFICES

I certify the results for the following **LOCAL OFFICE:**

For the ranked-choice voting contest Assessor-Recorder, the following table provides "Round 0" totals for the contest, which represent how voters marked their ballots before the application of the ranked-choice voting method. The table also lists vote totals from "Round 1," which represents the number of first-choice selections after the advancement of later selections that occurs when voters leave the first-choice selection blank or include names of people who are not official, qualified write-in candidates.

**ASSESSOR-RECORDER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JOAQUÍN TORRES</td>
<td>117,336</td>
<td>99.91%</td>
<td>124,486</td>
<td>99.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICHAEL PETRELIS*</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Votes</td>
<td>117,445</td>
<td></td>
<td>124,597</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undervotes</td>
<td>62,293</td>
<td></td>
<td>55,141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhausted</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhausted by Overvotes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ballots Cast</td>
<td>179,739</td>
<td></td>
<td>179,739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Qualified Write-In Candidate
List of SHA-512 Hash Values for Certified Results Reports
Statement of the Results
Consolidated Special Municipal Election, February 15, 2022

This list represents the various certified results reports the Department of Elections issued for the February 15, 2022, Consolidated Special Municipal Election. The file names for each report are listed numerically, and underneath each file name is the SHA-512 cryptographic hash value applicable to each file. All reports are posted on the Department’s website: [www.sfelections.org/results](http://www.sfelections.org/results)

1. **“Summary – PDF,”** lists a summary of votes cast by contest, using a PDF format.

   Hash value:
   500030C9B0B1073DB57D2E047FF35E2A1891DB090FE35E1263B3615594B0FE434EA4F0A1F
   A1B0EDB3078E7A483458DC29C09AA13AFF21AC761E5B525605EA176

2. **“Summary – Excel,”** lists a summary of votes cast by contest, using Microsoft Excel.

   Hash value:
   03F0D5E45784516A9C9F0A748E38C614078E44DE96FE5DEBDA814DA67C4597819349F6B4C9
   159A743B4C6DB44BE09035137BE4195B461F1474B093A93285BF32

3. **“Summary – XML,”** lists a summary of votes cast by contest, using XML format.

   Hash value:
   AA005DBCB83381E9F59FD1FE20D385AB482B85DE5BBAAEE2E59843B563F33E12C755BF1A65
   EE9676181E82E311A46EAA24A59511D0FCA31824F1480173DBA695D

4. **“SOV – PDF,”** lists votes cast in each precinct and for each contest, using a PDF format.

   Hash value:
   16E529D7AF1E8B067D5D9FD0899A764F579952D109E70B93FF4A23A2C54A78F3FC6C60CCFF
   38ED09DD24B61EDD20E782C65E3DDD3CB3C5CDB0A094B9667CD480

5. **“SOV – Excel,”** lists votes cast in each precinct and for each contest, using Microsoft Excel.

   Hash value:
   1F92B5B68C75571CC689E74E644D9AC77303F35B9DCD62E48E325ACE9A7A6EE08E795C25
   900D94C7F9D7836BCB6D9B34C32E16850525EDF7A643C4B08BA568A1
List of SHA-512 Hash Values for Certified Results Reports
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6. “District SOV – PDF,” lists votes cast in each district and for each contest, using a PDF format.

   Hash value:
   2CEF1ED44F5679C49C475DF8ACD603E66E0679BFA86B8BD01F82F7C8306408624D9366CEA
   9ACB5333BB17A30E6961963F78325EA59BDA2D33CC59B1617A79EB

7. “District SOV – Excel,” lists votes cast in each district and for each contest, using Microsoft Excel.

   Hash value:
   9AF88BC9103EADFF3E7FE68777F077386C1665E171BF87518CE07C8B8626AC8E888DA0AE
   40785D76E63D95A104EF5F1F61B55ABFA185433ECCF372CE1A70F7B

8. “Cast Vote Record - JSON,” lists votes cast on each ballot card in a zipped JSON format.

   Hash value:
   0D09CA0171F3CC97DCE5F50DED86B86AA951306400D3C84B17BC57F64251DF66EB0E2B
   BC06BC428C4ED7063C396B658D852919BBF51A1BC1641574EB77B81B4


   Hash value:
   320B91281C290547B7DDA0B86A0BFA30A4187E59A05E25E94C3CD1BB95A08CA35919F11
   A240EEC4A9C4861B658B5485B94529D29A444E9FD497DEC071A5DEAB


    Hash value:
    207A62A0431FD9331B5FE0649F66FCA6848E24FAF33938464E34A9B7915CA151D73D26A40D
    391E8852015C2CEA1298EB4DAF7C157B7F0AE132FE231AAD33D036


    Hash value:
    CA3E75C3C6E5CA3F1D2264F7FA368BE255BDB1B7FED90D4A53300C30F0D6A5DB8B4E4DA
    EE685D902FBEADF12A2B7AB35D214B735742DB7A276F4B479F578C0B7
12. "Ballot Images, District 4 - ZIP", contains scanned ballot images in zipped TIFF format.

Hash value:
976823DD88FE6E6D07B68CC21AF80972089A074B3E812F2FCF25CDDE29C4DFD71123D31D7
25F29B2D18E778929853E71F3350F604411079D9AD8A151EDB1E218


Hash value:
5B064AB0EE2973934FB92659A4C095757E90E2D6E8E99247BFC16D15DE96248694A21370
B4CC2A034C30B6B06C5CDDFDCA29FED4DBBE75462D121386D8C3E


Hash value:
A97C1AE6AD5528A03DAE4174AFA8CA5BB200AD5DFF25BE6ACE9DFAEAF74B83F3909385
3F37F62F306106256DFCD28C5D481B993BDFDD4D7D64C1880591AF489

15. "Ballot Images, District 7 - ZIP", contains scanned ballot images in zipped TIFF format.

Hash value:
E82A92B1B513F81168F57D0F676CB44C1597FBA5D29668357C2D7302A5A682C9ED775A3D
D505593370719EDF2F02C7983B1AFFEA0B2B0045EF4A712A566C6A0


Hash value:
9BEF65F0E96E189604D63728B94F4E3FEC1856A59E8110DD4AC7C50019D7C51176F86ED55
A0941BA8CD94D23AD08502C076ADF0800EDE23228D36E1551DA0AC7


Hash value:
FC1883819A5BC45C3B51631C36DE8B38E6D333AC3DC5D57031145A59BB083D9D832515A8
D3535AA9B139EFEDA2474C5615208ADE673F7267128E99FFAE95CE03
List of SHA-512 Hash Values for Certified Results Reports
Statement of the Results
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   Hash value:
   A3C6BD0B4FCBE1610A4AE5D05F5E117D15F32871CA276C894E6417E0B527E9F287AAF200D697EAD9FA3A74279039FDE909EF0956DABBD74321C31D0C0A90BCC70

   Hash value:
   996BDF0CB226361CB84FB5E17CF25C83F116735A78E24FD017F74189C6F70B5BA3BE9A4F4DAC99D334D7341A72B3B01EC7FA3804108034EEA9B90E7D5F9E2A4D

    Hash value:
    F1854423A5526F646B64CB9533FCA309FA792A7AEEF0EE126A70D654A101426BD1D3783E246F0A102A4B942A02F8B54890AC213117E35BEAD16E991987DC6402D1F7046

21. "ImageCast Central Logs - ZIP," audit logs from ImageCast Central machines used at City Hall.
    Hash value:
    8DB617FCD466B64CB9533FCA309FA792A7AEEF0EE126A70D654A101426BD1D3783E246F0A102A4B942A02F8B54890AC213117E35BEAD16E991987DC6402D1F7046

22. "Vote-by-Mail Status Report," lists the disposition of the vote-by-mail ballots the Department received.
    Hash value:
    4127B1055B115300E63C4DBB35796B51E835F953E2CDB7DF93843501F6D14E81579DE8EA17AD733DEF0EB33B8375594E95BA2545CE3D3A9D4957341FA76DAC56

23. "Provisional Ballot Status Report," lists the disposition of the provisional ballots the Department received.
    Hash value:
    6FAB9EAD6D4C8768465B668EF9713CC61C3ED283455D9F5869E5274138C26F423F4C98FEB2F966759A6314D381C90E1A161152E8DA540EC80E304D87ED489B49

   Hash value:
   B32D4D92DFFA835E069869DFDF23D04466117F076718B8F4BAB06BAB4FF259847FDF88B835
   CC75DA5BD67547255141E47D29C7541CA5424B1F12F5121BA137A9

25. “SHA-512.csv,” provides a list of all hashed election results files in CSV format.

   Hash value:
   766F3B304FC4AEDB0C0FD02DCC7F52E52F3AEB7D1788F5AC54C8A506E97D24091BBBCBA
   EAE5C2E3487E78058845027451442EE2215163B88E1130153BC1F043A
February 15, 2022, Consolidated Special Municipal Election
Results of 1% Post-Election Manual Tallies

Pursuant to state elections law, the San Francisco Department of Elections (Department) is required to conduct a manual tally of all ballots cast in 1% of San Francisco’s polling places and 1% of the vote-by-mail ballots cast, and may also manually tally 1% of provisional ballots cast, as part of the Official Canvass of the election. The Department compares the results of the manual tallies to the results reports generated by the voting equipment used to tabulate ballot cards. The purpose of the manual tallies is to verify the accuracy of the voting equipment used in the election. Upon completion of the 1% manual tallies, the Department prepares a report on the results of the manual tallies and includes the report in the certification of the Official Canvass for the election.

The following is a report on the results of the manual tallies of 1% of the polling place, vote-by-mail, and provisional ballots cast in the February 15, 2022, Consolidated Special Municipal Election.

Random Selection of Precincts
On February 20, 2022, the Department conducted a random selection of precincts and batches for the manual tallies in accordance with California Elections Code section 15360.

Five days prior to selecting the precincts and batches for the manual tallies, the Department issued a press release and posted a public notice on its website, sfelections.org, and outside its office, announcing the date, time, and place of the random selection of precincts and batches. Additionally, the Department webcast the random selection process and posted the recording on its website.

For the February 15 election, the Department was required to conduct a manual tally of ballots cast in a minimum of four precincts, to represent 1% of San Francisco’s 314 polling places included in the election, and 1% of all vote-by-mail and, optionally, provisional ballots. State elections law also requires a manual tally of votes cast to be conducted on all contests present in the election.

The random selection was divided into three categories. The first category was for selecting four precincts for ballots cast at the polling places. The second category was for selecting five batches (or boxes) of Vote-By-Mail (VBM) ballots representing 1% of all VBM ballots counted. The third category was for selecting one batch (or box) for the Provisional (PV) ballots. Using three 10-sided dice, the Department randomly selected the precincts and batches to be tallied in full. All the
contests in the election were covered in all the drawn precincts and batches. For a list of randomly selected precincts and batches contests tallied in each precinct, see Part I below.

Conducting the 1% Manual Tallies
The 1% manual tallies of randomly selected precincts and batches began on Tuesday, February 22, 2022, and was completed on the same day. The manual tallies occurred in the Department's warehouse on Pier 31, which is located along The Embarcadero. The manual tallies were open to public observation both in person and via live streaming on the Department's website at sfelections.org/live.

For each selected precinct and batch, Department personnel manually tallied votes cast on the ballots, including polling place ballots cast using the Ballot Scanning Machines (BSM), and accepted vote-by-mail and provisional ballots, including those issued at the Department's City Hall Voting Center. Vote-by-mail and provisional ballots, and paper duplications of ballots through the remake process using the Ballot Marking Device are tabulated using the ImageCast Central (ICC) machines. The manual counts were then compared against the results reports issued by the voting system. If there were any discrepancies between the two tallies, the Department sought resolution or explanations for these discrepancies.

Department personnel worked in four, four-person teams to manually tally votes on polling place ballots, vote-by-mail, and provisional ballots. Each team was assigned one precinct or one batch to count at a time. After all the votes for a contest had been counted, a supervisor verified whether the manual count matched the machine count. If all the vote counts matched, the team proceeded to the next contest until all the contests on the card had been counted.

Results of the 1% Manual Tallies
After a manual tally, Department personnel seek to resolve any potential discrepancies, or variances, between the tally and the machine count and document the resolutions using Manual Tally Incident forms. In accordance with the Post-Election Manual Tally Emergency Regulations, a “variance” means any difference between the machine tally and the manual tally for a contest, including, but not limited to, differences due to machine malfunction, operator error, or voter error in marking a ballot.

Upon completion of the manual tallies associated with ballots cast in San Francisco for the February 15, Consolidated Special Municipal Election, the Department found one incidence of a mismatch in votes counted for the recall measure regarding Allison Collins. A review of the ballots showed the cause to be a combination of a smudged erasure on one ballot card and a very faint vote mark on another ballot card. This occurred in batch number 225 of the VBM ballots. Due to the dark smudge on the ballot card under precinct 7106, the vote mark was picked up by the machine and resulted in an overvote. On another ballot for the same contest under precinct 9438, the marking was very faint that the machine did not pick it up which resulted in an undervote. Although, both ballot cards went through the adjudication process, the image shown to the adjudicators were a clear overvote and an undervote, respectively, that no changes were made on these votes. Overall, no variances between the manual tallies and the results reports caused by voting equipment malfunction were found.
The results of the 1% manual tallies confirm that the voting equipment used in the February 15 election accurately tabulated and reported votes cast for contests appearing on the official ballot.

Following are tables that summarizes the manual tallies.

### Part I: Randomly Selected Precincts, Batches, and Contests Tallied for the 1% Manual Tallies

#### Randomly Selected Precincts/Batches and Contests Tallied for the 1% Manual Tally

**February 15, 2022 Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order Drawn</th>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>Ballot Type</th>
<th>Contests Tallied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1153</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>9127</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>7508</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>9443</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Initial six batches selected for VBM Ballots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order Drawn</th>
<th>Batch (Box) #</th>
<th>Contests Tallied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>092</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Initial batch selected for PV Ballots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order Drawn</th>
<th>Batch #</th>
<th>Contests Tallied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part II: Summary of Results of the 1% Manual Tallies

#### Summary of Results of the 1% Manual Tally

**February 15, 2022 Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>Contests Tallied</th>
<th>Precinct Ballots</th>
<th>Discrepancies found?</th>
<th>Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1153</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9127</td>
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<tr>
<td>7508</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9443</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Part III: Comparison of Manual and Machine Tallies (for discrepancies only)

The following table details each discrepancy found during the 1% Manual Tally, including the precinct number or batch number (in the case of VBM and PV) for which the discrepancy was found, the type of ballot on which the discrepancy was found, the number of votes indicated by the voting equipment results report (machine tally), the number of votes counted by the manual tally, and the variance between the results report and manual tally. Each discrepancy is color-coded to show the identified cause of variance. For this Election there were two types of causes; the smudge and the faint vote mark.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Batch (Box) #</th>
<th>Contests Tallied</th>
<th>Vote-by-Mail Ballots</th>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>Provisional Ballots</th>
<th>Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Box) #</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>366</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>All</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>092</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>219</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>01</td>
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<td>No</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table: Comparison of Manual and Machine Tallies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VBM Batch Number 225</th>
<th>Contest</th>
<th>Machine Tally</th>
<th>Manual Tally</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Machine Tally</th>
<th>Manual Tally</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recall Measure Regarding Alison Collins</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>2*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>-1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OVERVOTES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*cause of variance is due to 2 types (smudge and faint vote marks)*